Empty ideas: a critique of analytic philosophy

1. How empty is mainstream philosophy?

Most recent mainstream proposals are concretely empty ideas

A working idea of concrete reality

Observing the concretely empty in some recent mainstream philosophy

Our central distinction and three that have been philosophically salient

The concretely empty, the analytically empty and mainstream philosophy

2. Promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy.

Some pretty promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy

The substantial scientiphicalism of mainstream philosophy

Memory, history and emptiness

Various specifications of scientiphicalism and various departures from scientiphicalism

Interactionist entity dualism and the problem of causal pairings

Exploring philosophical thoughts that may be analytically empty ideas

3. Thinkers and what they can think about : empty issues and individualistic powers.

Language, thought and history

Thinking about "the external world"

Earth, twin Earth and history

The banality of successfully investigating unfamiliar individuals

A concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed powers

The propensity to acquire individualistic powers and its historical manifestation

A concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed mental powers

Generalistic propensities to acquire real-kind directed mental powers

Wishful blindness to emptiness : Putnam's "transcendental" pronouncement

Reading modal claims substantially and widening our philosophical horizons

4. The origins of material individuals : empty issues and sequentialistic powers

The origin of a particular wooden table

Some thoughts about tables and some thoughts about shmables

Origination conditions, persistence conditions, and boxing a logical compass

A tenet of scientiphicalism : basic individuals have no "memory-like" propensity

How a wooden table could have first been made from a hunk of ice

Tood and tice, a table first made of wood and a table first made of ice

Using modal terms substantially : the case of determinism

Distinctive material objects and these objects' distinctive matter

Sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars

Wooden tables, ice, and sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars

5. The persistence of material individuals : empty issues and self-directed propensity.

Material sculptures and pieces of matter

Are there inconveniently persisting material individuals?

Pieces, lumps and hunks : a problematic plethora of persisting individuals?

Is there a plethora of extraordinary persisting individuals?

Ordinary and not so ordinary persisting material individuals

Using these sentences differently and expressing substantial ideas

Fundamentals of fundamental material persistents

6. Empty debates about material matters.

Matter distributed particulately but not even a single material individual?

Matter distributed particulately, but only a single material individual?

Matter and material objects : salient positions on empty questions

The debate about complex material individuals

An exploration of the salient debate : popular paraphrases, problematic parallels

Complex material individuals and arrangements of simple material individuals

Mereological sums of simple material individuals : fusions, fusions everywhere

Sums of simple physical entities and complex ordinary material individuals

Four distinct sorts of spatial inhabitants : material mereological sums, material arrangements, complex material objects, and (complex) ordinary individuals

Worldy appendix

Are there any concrete worlds, including even the actual world?

7. Individuals, properties and time : a few substantial thoughts and many empty ideas.

Are there really any properties or are there only all the propertied individuals?

The temporal, the empty and the substantial : First part

The temporal, the empty and the substantial : Second part

Is there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? First part

Is there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? Second part

8. What will become of us : empty issues and substantial speculations.

Locke's proposed persons

Locke's lame legacy

Beyond Locke, but not beyond philosophical thoughts both incorrect and empty

So-called commonsensical materialism

So-called commonsensical materialism and the mental problems of the many

Might you be a quite simple physical thing? If so, what will become of you?

Articulating our argument for a substantial dualist view of ourselves

How an immaterial soul may, or may not, survive the death of its body

If we should become disembodied souls, will we be experiencing souls? If we become experiencing disembodied souls, will we be fortunate souls?

9. When will there be some serious new substantial philosophy?

Concretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : First part

Concretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : Second part

Some substantial philosophical thoughts about actual concrete reality

Scientific philosophers and serious new substantial philosophy

Philosophy may mine and refine what even the most ambitious sciences produce

Concrete reality and modest philosophy.